TL;DR
This proposal aims to optimize LXDAO’s voting and proposal rights system, making governance participation more accessible for members, while enhancing voting engagement and governance efficiency.
Background
Under the current LXDAO governance framework, Buidler Card holders automatically receive permanent governance tokens. As the number of members grows, governance apathy has gradually led to the dilution of the influence of those actively concerned with community affairs and governance.
Currently, 91 members are eligible to vote, with approximately 16-20 regularly participating in voting.
To ensure voting accurately reflects the opinions and decisions of active members, this proposal outlines how to optimize the design of voting rights. It aims to exclude inactive members from the total vote count while allowing less active members to voice their opinions at any time. It also incentivizes member participation in governance and adds a requirement for proposals to indicate whether they are consensus proposals or general proposals, leaving the determination of proposal levels to the community.
Description
Current System:
- Before the issuance of the governance token $LX, only the Buidler Card acts as voting power.
- Voting uses a dynamic threshold system.
- A general proposal passes if the absolute minimum number of affirmative votes ≥ 10%. (Consensus proposals require ≥ 40%).
- Absolute affirmative votes = affirmative votes - (opposition votes x 2 + abstention votes). For example, 30 affirmative votes, 20 opposition votes, 2 abstentions, absolute affirmative votes = -12 votes.
Revised System:
Voting Rights Plan
- Without changing the design of Buidler Card and LXP, members holding a Buidler Card can apply for a voting rights token at any time during a quarter, valid for one quarter.
- Voting continues to use a dynamic threshold system.
- A general proposal passes if the absolute minimum number of affirmative votes ≥ 20%. (Consensus proposals require ≥ 70%).
- Absolute affirmative votes = affirmative votes - opposition votes. For example, 30 affirmative votes, 20 opposition votes, 10 affirmative votes.
- Opposition votes include both “no” votes and abstentions.
- Each quarter has its own token, which is not reused.
- A simplified page will be provided for members to apply for voting rights for the current quarter.
- This ensures that only inactive members are excluded from the total count, while less active members can still apply for tokens to vote or express dissent passively.
Compared to the original plan, this reduces the excessive weight of opposition votes and restores voting to a more democratic form, with 20% for general proposals and 70% for consensus proposals.
Proposal Rights Plan
- A voting rights token is required before proposal rights can be exercised.
- The proposer should indicate in the proposal whether it is a general proposal or a consensus proposal. If members disagree with the proposal level, they can vote to reject it and request the proposer to adjust the level.
- Guidance on how to distinguish between general and consensus proposals will be provided in the forum/Docs.
Compared to the current system, if the proposer is unsure about the proposal level, it can be left to community consensus, reducing time spent discussing proposal levels and improving governance efficiency.
Incentive Plan
- Incentives will be distributed based on the voting activity each quarter, and the incentive budget will need to be approved in advance through a budget proposal.
- Rewards will be distributed according to the proportion of active votes. Initially, they will be distributed manually, with future plans to use smart contracts for calculation and distribution.
In addition to modifying the voting and proposal mechanism, the added incentive plan is expected to further increase the community’s governance activity.
Budgets And Distribution
This proposal does not require additional funding, as the governance group will bear the contribution rewards generated by this proposal.
Key Result
The goal of this proposal is to enhance governance efficiency, provide LXDAO with improved voting and proposal incentive mechanisms, increase member activity, optimize organizational efficiency, and lay the foundation for further improvements in governance measures.
TL;DR
此提案旨在优化LXDAO的投票和提案权制度，使成员参与治理更便捷，同时提高投票积极性和治理效率。
Background
当前LXDAO的治理框架中，Buidler Card持有者自动获得永久治理通证，随着人数的增加后，治理冷漠的问题以逐渐导致当前积极关心社区事务和参与治理人员的权重变低。
目前已累积91个成员具备投票资格，长期参予投票的人数大约集中在16~20人之间。
为始投票真实表达出活跃成员的意见与决议。本提案提出了如何优化投票权的设计，避免未活跃会员被统计在总票数中，同时确保低活跃成员能随时表达意见的方案，并进一步激励成员参予治理，另一方面也针对提案增加需说明为共识提案或普通提案，将提案级别判断交还社区这里。
Description
现有方案：
- 在治理代币 $LX 发行前，仅 Buidler Card 可以作为投票权。
- 计票采取动态阈值的方式。
- 普通级提案最低绝对赞成票数 ≥ 10% 即为通过。（共识级提案需≥40%）
- 绝对赞成票 = 赞成票 - （反对票 X 2+弃权票）。例如，30 票赞成，20 票反对，2弃权，绝对赞成票 = -12 票
修改后方案：
投票权方案
- 在不变更Buidler Card和LXP的设计基础上，持有Buidler Card 的成员每季可随时申请投票权通证，有效期为一季。
- 计票采取动态阈值的方式。
- 普通级提案最低绝对赞成票数 ≥ 20% 即为通过。（共识级提案需≥70%）
- 绝对赞成票 = 赞成票 - 反对票。例如，30 票赞成，20 票反对，弃权，绝对赞成票 = 10 票
- 反对票包括反对票和弃权票。
- 每季通证为独立通证，不重复使用
- 提供人员简易申请当季投票权的页面
- 此举确保仅非活跃成员被排除在总统计之外，而低活跃成员仍可申请通证以参与投票或消极表达反对意见。
相较于原方案，可减低反对票权重过高的影响，让投票恢复以20%普通提案，70%共识提案的形式进行，更接近真实的民主状态呈现。
提案权方案
- 需先取得投票权才可执行提案权
- 提案人应在提案中标明是普通提案或共识提案，成员若不同意提案等级，可投否决票，要求提案人重新调整提案等级。
- 在论坛/Docs 提供对普通提案或共识提案判断的引导。
相较于现况，提案人如果无法完全确定提案等级，可交由成员共识决议，减少讨论提案等级的时间，加速治理效率。
激励方案
- 激励将基于每季投票通证的投票状况发放，激励预算需事先通过预算提案。
- 奖励将根据活跃投票比例分配，初期手工发放，未来可通过智能合约计算并发放。
除了修改投票跟提案机制外，再增加激励方案，可望进一步提高社区的治理活跃度。
Budgets And Distribution
此提案不需要额外申请支出，由治理小组承担因此次提案而产生的贡献奖励
Key result
该提案的目标是提高治理效率，为LXDAO提供更好的投票与提案激励机制，提高成员活跃度，优化组织运作效率，为更多治理措施的提升提供基础。