Title: Builder Card Vote power change
Date: 2023.10.28
Editor: Marcus, Jomosis, Tristan
TL:DR
The proposal will change the governance power of the Builder Card, separating the proposal power and voting power of the Builder Card. The Builder Card will have the default proposal power, but if one wants to have voting power, they need to claim the badge representing the voting power.
Proposal power: The right to initiate proposals.
Voting power: The power to vote on proposals and express opinions.
In addition, this is a consensus-level proposal, and to gain more attention, the voting time for Snapshot proposals will be extended to 2 weeks.
Background
In the past 10 Snapshot proposals, the overall voting rate is around 30%. Currently, we have 67 builder card holders, which is not a particularly good phenomenon. The main reasons for the low governance participation rate are as follows:
- Lack of incentives: Previous voting did not have clear voting incentives.
- High complexity: The complexity and professionalism of the proposals make it difficult for every member to understand.
- Lack of timely information notification: There is a lack of a more timely and extensive information ecosystem, which means that many Builder card holders may not know when the voting takes place and have not developed a habit of regular participation.
Governance Goals
LXDAO’s governance goals mainly have 2 objectives:
Capture resistance: Governance plays a key role in ensuring that LXDAO operates with resistance to capture and censorship. LXDAO should continue to operate in the future without being under the control of a single entity and prevent a small group or a few individuals from controlling LXDAO.
Resource allocation: The second main goal of governance is to allocate resources effectively to support LXDAO’s vision and achieve sustainability for valuable public goods.
Description
This proposal will change the governance power of the Builder Card and apply for the governance cycle.
- Builder Card voting power application system
Cancel the Builder Card proposal application: After meeting a certain contribution threshold, the Builder Card will be automatically claimed without the need for Snapshot voting.
The Builder Card has the default proposal power but does not have voting power: To have voting power, you need to apply for it. Members who successfully apply for it will receive an NFT with voting power, with 1 NFT = 1 vote.
Voting rules will continue to follow the dynamic threshold rules.
LIP0: Definition of LXDAO Governance Snapshot
When each proposal is issued, the minimum number of voters required is 21.
Each time an NFT with voting power is claimed, it will be automatically destroyed under the following conditions, and the voting power will be invalidated. If voting power is required, it needs to be reclaimed after 7 days.
- Starting from the claim of the voting power NFT, it will be destroyed after 3 months.
- If there is no participation in voting for 4 consecutive weekly governance cycles, it will be automatically destroyed.
- Establishment of Governance Fund
The governance fund will be used to incentivize individuals participating in governance. The main categories of incentivized individuals are as follows:
Governance participants: Members who vote on proposals and express opinions.
Governance reviewers: Members who provide constructive feedback on passed proposals. This feedback cycle includes from the birth of an idea to it becoming a Snapshot proposal.
Governance coordinators: Members who promote participation in the governance process. Governance coordinators will advocate for project presentations, proposal reviews, and proposal voting.
The governance fund will be proposed by the governance team at the end of each quarter at a strategic meeting and the spending will be publicly disclosed in the community.
- Optimization of proposal frameworks
Optimize the frameworks for different types of proposals to facilitate better understanding by members. Additionally, introduce a new section for expert comments to provide fair evaluations of proposals that may have been too technical in the forum proposal phase. However, this section is currently applicable only and in the future, every member should possess the ability to conduct comprehensive reviews of proposals.
Why propose a change in the voting mechanism?/Why not recommend lowering the voting threshold?/Why must opposing opinions be encouraged?
Today, we discuss governance issues one by one, the essence behind these discussions is how we can better promote online democracy.
Voting is a form of democracy that brings sovereignty back to individuals, which is the core spirit of Web3. The essence of democracy is equality. If voting becomes a program tool waving the flag of democracy, then voting itself will be meaningless. (This is the root cause of many problems in Latin American countries, where the surface of democracy hides the essence of populism.)
How can we avoid this?
Absolute equality: Voting power must not be equivalent to wealth and power or replaceable. Voting power should not be transferable. Therefore, we do not encourage token participation in governance; instead, we rely on community contributions to determine voting power.
Reliable Consensus: The essence behind trying to ensure that enough people participate in the vote is to try to make the consensus of the proposal we pass the vote on reliable enough. The consensus of a small active minority does not necessarily coincide with the consensus of the majority. That’s why we discourage lowering voting thresholds as a way to make governance more efficient. (Psychological Trap “Collective Delusion”: When the pressure for unanimity is very strong, this pressure causes the decision-making group to engage in a pattern of passive avoidance behavior, which in turn causes the group to prefer the least objectionable option", similar to the DAO governance where collective delusion occurs). cases, which have occurred not infrequently over the past year.)
Governance Criticism: Critical thinking is an important philosophical mindset that also plays a very important role in governance. We should realize that any system building, to a certain extent, violates the laws of nature, and that proposals with a high degree of consensus are bound to have side effects. The earlier these side effects are raised, the earlier they can be prevented and eradicated. That’s why we encourage critical comment on proposals, and it’s so necessary; it doesn’t just mean opposition, it’s also urging how a proposal that passes can be better. (Often the most consequential historical events started from seemingly moral starting points: Wilson’s proposal for national self-determination directly inflamed German nationalism and led to the outbreak of World War II.) So even the best starting point needs to grow and be implemented in criticism)
Power and Morality Interaction: In the process of governance, we often overlook the fact that the essence of social activity is the interaction of power and morality. It is that when we exercise the power we have, we must make each responsible subject aware of his or her moral obligations. So we must make sure that the individual who has the right to vote is aware of his moral obligations. The use of active applications, the receipt of governance manuals, and small tests to ensure that he is aware of his ethical obligations are essential.
Responsibility tracking and subsidization of obligations: In order to increase the efficiency of the governance, an institutional wall is erected outside the ethical wall: the right to vote is frozen for those who have not voted for a long period of time, and they have to reapply for activation. Appropriate incentives will be given to individuals in governance who are active in terms of voting participation and output of opinions.
Budgets And Distribution
This proposal is a consensus-level proposal that does not require an additional request for expenditures, and the Governance Team will bear the rewards for contributions resulting from this proposal Applications for governance funds will be determined at the end of each quarterly strategy meeting.
Key result
Significant increase in governance rate: from 30% to 70%.
More people interested in governance: more people interested in governance through governance manuals and educational outreach.
参与编辑：Marcus,Jomosis,Tristan
TL: DR
提案将改变 Buidler Card 的治理权，将 Buidler Card 的提案权和投票权进行分离，Buidler Card 默认具有提案权，但如需具有投票权，那么需要申领代表投票权的徽章
提案权：发起提案的权利
投票权：对提案进行投票和发表意见的权力
同时，这是一个共识级提案，为了获得更多人的关注，申请将 Snapshot 提案投票时间延长至 2 周
Background
在近 10 个 Snapshot 提案中，整体投票率占 30% 左右，目前我们有 67 位 builder card 持有者，目前并不是一个特别好的现象，针对这种现象，我总结下来是：治理率参与过低
治理率参与过低主要来自于以下几点
- 缺乏激励：之前的投票并未有明显的投票激励
- 复杂度高：提案的复杂和专业程度过高，导致并不是每个成员都能理解
- 信息通知不及时：缺乏更及时和广泛的信息生态系统，意味着许多 Buidler card 持有者可能不知道投票何时发生，也没有养成有利于定期参与的习惯
治理目标
LXDAO 的治理目标主要有 2 个目标
捕获阻力：治理在确保 LXDAO 的运行具有反捕获和抗审查方面发挥着关键作用，LXDAO 在未来应当不应受单个实体的情况下继续运行，以及防止一小撮或一部分人能够控制 LXDAO
资源分配：治理的第二个主要目标是有效分配资源以支持 LXDAO 的愿景并为有价值的公共物品实现可持续性
Description
本提案将更改 Buidler card 的治理权，以及申请治理周期
- Buidler card 投票权采取申请制
取消 Builder Card 提案申请：在满足一定贡献值门槛后，将会自动申领获得 Buidler Card，不再需要进行 Snapshot 投票
Builder Card 默认具有提案权，但不具备投票权：当你想拥有投票权的时候，需要进行申领，申领成功的成员将被空投一个具有投票权的 NFT，1 个 NFT = 一票
投票通过规则沿用动态阈值规则 LIP0: Definition of LXDAO Governance Snapshot
每次提案发出的时候，需满足最低具有投票权人数：21 人
每次申领具有投票权的 NFT 将会在以下条件自动销毁，同时投票权失效，如需要投票权，需等待 7 天后再度申领
- 从申领投票权 NFT 开始计时，达到 3 个月时间销毁
- 连续 4 次每周治理周期未参与投票，自动销毁
- 设定治理基金
治理基金将用作激励参与治理的人员，主要激励的人员有三类对象
治理参与者：对提案进行投票，发表意见的成员
治理评论者：对通过的提案提出建设性意见的成员，这个意见的周期包括在 idea 诞生到最后成为 snapshot 提案
治理协调者：呼吁大家参与治理进程的成员，治理协调者将会呼吁大家参与项目宣讲，提案评论，提案投票
治理基金将由治理小组每个季度末在战略会议上提出具体的申请份额，并在社区公示花费情况
- 提案框架优化
针对不同类型的提案进行框架优化，便于成员更好的理解，同时提出一个新的专家寄语环节，针对一些在论坛提案环节中专业度过高的提案，邀请专家小组成员进行中肯性的评价，当然，这个环节仅适用于目前，在未来，每个成员都应当具备对提案进行完备审核的能力
为什么要更改投票机制的提案？/为什么不建议降低投票的阈值？/为什么一定要鼓励反对的意见？
今天我们讨论一个个的治理问题，其背后的本质都是在讨论我们如何更好的推进线上的民主治理
投票一种民主的形式，让主权回归个人是 Web3 的核心精神 民主精神的实质是平等，如果投票仅沦为某种挥舞着民主旗号的程序工具，那么投票本身将毫无意义。（这正是目前诸多拉美国家的问题根源，表面的民主背后的实质是民粹）
我们又该如何避免？
绝对平等: : 投票权一定不能与财富和权力对等或者可替换，投票权不能是流动的。所以我们不鼓励代币可参与治理，而是依靠社区贡献度来决定，拥有投票权力的成员在投票上绝对平等。同时也不鼓励投票权可委托转移给他人。
共识可靠: 要尽量保证足够多的投票参与，背后的实质是要尽量让我们通过投票的提案共识是足够可靠的。活跃小部分人的共识不一定与大部分人的共识一致。所以我们不鼓励通过降低投票阈值的方式来提高治理效率。 （心灵学陷阱“集体迷思”：追求全体一致的压力非常强大时，这种压力就会使这个决策团体出现消极逃避行为模式，进而导致决策团体偏向于选择那些最不会遭到反对的方案”，类似发生集体迷思的DAO治理案例，在过去一年当中发生的并不少见。）
治理批判: 批判思维是一种重要的哲学思维，在治理中也扮演着非常重要的作用。我们应当意识到任何的制度建设，一定程度都是违反自然规律的，再高共识的提案一定也会有副作用。这些副作用越早被提出，就越早被预防和根治。所以我们鼓励针对提案批判性意见的提出，而且是非常有必要的，它不仅仅代表反对，它也是在督促一项通过的提案如何更好的进行。 （通常后果影响最大的历史事件，一开始都是出自看似道德的出发点：威尔逊提出的民族自决直接煽动了德国民族主义，导致二战爆发。所以再好的出发点也需要在批判中成长和实施）
权力与道德互动: 在治理过程中，我们常常忽略社会活动的本质是权力和道德的互动。就是当我们施行我们所拥有的权力时，我们必须让每个责任主体意识到自己的道德义务。所以我们必须要确保拥有投票权的个人知晓他的道德义务。采用主动申请，领取治理手册，以及以小的测试确保他知晓自己的道德义务是非常有必要的。
责任追踪和义务补贴: 为提高治理效率，在道德的高墙外在竖立起制度的高墙：针对长期不投票的人冻结其投票权，需重新申请激活。并针对投票参与活跃以及意见输出活跃的治理个体给予适当的激励
Budgets And Distribution
此提案为共识级提案，不需要额外申请支出，由治理小组承担因此次提案而产生的贡献奖励 针对治理基金的申请，将在每季度末的战略会议上确定
Key result
治理率的极大提升：从目前的 30% 提升到 70%
更多的人关注治理：通过治理手册以及教育普及，让更多的人关注治理
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