Voting Mechanisms
Summary
One of the biggest obstacles to decentralized governance is that not enough people are involved.
When few people are involved, the project becomes less decentralized, which raises several interrelated issues. Less participation.
- Allowing adversaries to execute governance attacks more cheaply.
- raises regulatory and legal issues related to securities law
- Erodes the democratic legitimacy of the organization, which can make it more difficult to recruit contributors, attract users, or achieve basic goals.
In the last season, our voting adoption threshold, based on the discussions of the first governance group, was set at
- Voting period: 3~7 Days
- Voting threshold:>50%
- Voting Quorum: Around 70% of SBT holders
We found several major problems in the implementation of this mechanism
- Buidler was not motivated to vote, and each vote required a lot of human effort for notification, creating ‘rush’ behavior
- the threshold required for voting was too high, as the insufficient turnout of proposals led to some items not being passed in time, creating a governance burden
- Governance behavior is not rewarded as it should be
Directions for improvement
- design the governance cycle to foster buidler fixed voting awareness (Done)
- lower the voting rate threshold and increase the weight of negative votes to avoid clique behavior (Done)
- design governance matching reward system (In process)
Issues that still need to be addressed
Governance Matching Incentive System
- Buidler fixed pay system
Fixed LXP per month per buidler, deducted for non-participation in governance and community activities
https://forum.lxdao.io/t/about-buidlers-plans-to-add-lxp/486
- governance includes not only voting, the study of governance mechanisms also includes contributing to governance, the design of this aspect (eg: governance bounty tasks)
Reference：
Paying People to Participate in Governance
https://www.notion.so/lxdao/Formal-DAO-Approval-ff9f5995d5dc4573b9285492020eda92